Hume and Critical Realism

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It is astonishing how much freedom I feel after a rejection of Hume-an Constant Conjunctions; the twin ideas that the limitations in perception in turn limit the knowledge one can acquire to that of observing “constant conjunctions”, and that the weaknesses of induction prevent one from locating real “laws”. Hence the absence of “laws” in science, in favor of “laws which haven’t been disproved yet”. Critical Realism allows a rejection of Hume-an Constant Conjunctions on an ontological basis. Such a rejection re-defines science, from the task of locating constant conjunctions to the task of locating reality’s ontology and subsequently creating theories to explain how they operate. While the result is that I approach science in largely the same way I did beforehand, I know have a considerably firmer philosophical base from which to operate – and one which serves to explain how science both does and should operate. Hume, and his legacy of Positivism, does no such thing.

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